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Non-SURILWV DQG WKH µKROORZHG RXW¶ VWDWH WKH WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ RI working conditions 
through personalising social care services during an era of austerity  
 
Ian Cunningham,  
University of Strathclyde 
 
This article explores the impact of state reforms to increase customer authority in social care 
at a time of public sector austerity in Scotland. The article focuses on the implications of these 
reforms for state ± non-profit relations and the ODWWHU¶V employment policies. The study 
proposes a theoretical framework to explore these themes using LQVLJKWVIURPWKHµKROORZLQJ
RXW¶ WKHVLV -HVVRS  5KRGHV  DQG WKH FXVWRPHU RULHQWDWHG EXUHDXFUDF\ concept 
(Korczynski, 2002). Non-profits respond to increased customer authority from personalisation 
and public expenditure cuts by adopting more competitive relations with each other. They also 
introduce contradictory µVRIW¶ DQG µKDUG¶ +uman Resource Management (HRM) reforms. 
Workers face multiple demands to be more flexible and exhibit commitment WR µILW¶ ZLth 
customer needs. Despite some increases in skills, the increasing influence of customer authority 
and efficiency savings mean employees experience multiple degradations in employment 
conditions affecting pay, job security, skills and work intensification. 
 
Key words $XVWHULW\ FXVWRPHUV HPSOR\PHQW µKROORZLQJ RXW¶ SHUVRQDOLVDWLRQ WKH VWDWH
non-profits 
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INTRODUCTION 
This article explores the impact on non-profits and their employment policies from Scottish 
government reforms aiming to increase customer authority through personalising social care 
services while implementing significant public expenditure reductions. Previous international 
studies of state ± non-profit relations and their impact on WKHODWWHU¶Vemployment policies focus 
on new public mDQDJHPHQW¶V 130 DSSDUDWXV RI JRDO VHWWLQJ SHrformance monitoring, 
outputs and cost cutting on the labour process of care (Baines, 2004: Charlesworth, 2010). 
These studies reveal employment degradation, but provide limited insight into the implications 
RI130¶VQRWLRQVRI the service user as customer (see Hood, 1991) on non-profit working 
conditions. This gap is unsurprising given the aforementioned studies explore non-profit 
employment outcomes at a time when the apparatus of NPM brought a greater 
bureaucratisation and standardization of services and work organisation (Baines, 2004) 
allowing limited flexibility to users or workers to develop choice in service provision. 
 
As a major plank of public service reform across Western industrialised countries (Needham, 
2011: Osborne and Strokosch, 2013), personalisation in social care represents an opportunity 
to begin to address this knowledge gap. Despite ambiguity in its definition (Needham, 2011), 
personalisation is supposed to encourage greater customer authority in public services 
through tailoring delivery to individual needs rather than XQLIRUPµRQH-size-fits-DOO¶
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provision for the µDYHUDJHFLWL]HQ¶1HHGKDP: Kessler and Bach, 2011). These changes 
are designed to challenge supplier dominance, assuming service recipients as customers can 
take control in their own lives (Duffy, 1996: Leadbeater, 2004: Kessler and Bach, 2011: 
Needham, 2011). Scotland represents a useful focus of study in this regard given the 
introduction in 2010 of a ten year strategy encouraging the personalisation of social care 
(Kettle, 2015). 
 
In contemporary social care, however, the proclaimed improvements in service quality face 
challenges as outcomes are shaped by another state-inspired policy in Scotland ± public service 
austerity. For the purposes of this study, austerity policies are understood to be a series of 
measures introduced across the UK from 2010 by Conservative-led governments aimed at 
reducing public expenditures (Bach, 2012: Clarke and Newman, 2012). These dual state-
induced pressures on social care providers reflect the key tensions facing all contemporary 
service organisations - the need to secure customer satisfaction, while facing calls for 
rationalisation and savings (Korczynski, 2002). 
 
Personalisation and austerity bring changing expectations regarding the behaviours and 
attributes of non-profits. For many years, non-profits have competed over contracts issued by 
various central and local government agencies. Under personalisation, competition is 
intensified as non-profits are expected to compete for income from individuals possessing 
personal budgets. Non-profits subsequently need to demonstrate greater competitive appeal 
through attracting and retaining thousands of current and potential service users on the basis of 
price and quality. The changing policy context, therefore, may exacerbate a tendency among 
non-profits to become more pro-market in their behaviours and practices. That is, in response 
WRWKHVWDWH¶VPDUNHWL]DWLRQRIFDUHQRQ-profits increasingly commercialise their practices and 
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engage in more competitive relations with each other (Van Til, 2000: Shields, Evans and 
Richmond, 2005: Shields, 2014). 
 
To evaluate the impact of the aforementioned dual pressures on non-profits and their 
employment policies, this article proposes a two-part theoretical framework. The first uses the 
µKROORZLQJ RXW¶ WKHVLs (Jessop, 2002: Rhodes, 1994). The thesis provides a framework to 
understand the implications from the state ceding responsibility for direct public service 
provision to networks of external providers (Jessop, 2002). This study particularly uses the 
concept of µGHVWDWLVDWLRQ¶(Jessop, 2002) to evaluate KRZWKHVWDWH¶VUHFDVWLQJRIWKHLGHQWLW\RI
WKHVHUYLFHXVHUWRWKDWRIµFXVWRPHU¶at a time of austerity changes the role and behaviour of 
non-profits and other actors in the Scottish social care market.  
 
The second SDUWRIWKHVWXG\¶VIUDPHZRUNthen theorises the impacts of these changing state ± 
non-profit relations on the ODWWHU¶V workforce. The article argues that the full implications of 
WKHVWDWH¶VSROLFLHVRILQFUHDVHGFXVWRPHUDXWKRULW\DQGUDWLRQDOLVDWLRQRQQRQ-profit work are 
EHVW FDSWXUHG WKURXJK .RUF]\QVNL¶V µFXVWRPHr-RULHQWDWHG EXUHDXFUDF\¶ (COB) conceptual 
framework (2002). The COB concept is useful here as it is used to evaluate how organisations 
apply Human Resource Management (HRM) policies in response to pressures for efficiency 
and rationalisation, while simultaneously attempting to deliver satisfaction and pleasure to 
customers (Korczynski, 2002) 
 
The article proceeds with a literature section that explains in-depth the contribution of the 
hollowing out thesis and the customer orientated bureaucracy (Korczynski, 2002) WRWKHVWXG\¶V
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objectives. After outlining research questions, the article then describes the method, followed 
by a presentation of findings, which uses qualitative data from interviews in six Scottish local 
authorities and eight non-profits. The final section provides a discussion and conclusion.  
 
The article proceeds by using the µKROORZLQJRXW¶WKHVLVDQG the COB concept to understand 
the sociology of non-profit ± state relationships, and their employment implications in an era 
of personalisation and austerity. 
 
LITERATURE  
Destatisation and the non-profit sector  
$NH\FRPSRQHQWRI WKHKROORZLQJRXW WKHVLV LV WKH FRQFHSWRI µGHVWDWLVDWLRQ¶ZKHUH VWDWHV
withdraw from direct service delivery and cede it to a variety of networks of local government, 
commercial and non-profit providers (Rhodes, 1994: Jessop, 2002: Jessop, 2003). Destatisation 
has two purposes. The first is to replace uniform public services in favour of more differentiated 
and flexible provision (Jessop, 1999), encouraging greater quality, choice and control for 
customers. The second is the utilisation of cheaper alternative providers to reduce welfare 
expenditures in order to improve competitiveness through public spending cuts (Jessop, 2002). 
The informal or third sector is seen as a central to the delivery of services in these networks 
(Jessop, 2002). Moreover, relations between the state and such external providers are fluid so 
that the former is able to alter the capacities and identities of the latter so they emerge as more 
suited to meet the demands from shifts in emphasis in the aforementioned policy priorities 
(Jessop, 2003). 
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CKDQJHVRFFXUULQJLQ6FRWODQG¶V social care market mean that relations between state and non-
profit sector are undergoing transition. Non-profits are being steered by government towards 
adopting changes in identity and practice when delivering social care. This is in response to the 
combination of two contemporary manifestations of destatisation - the Scottish Nationalist 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V SROLF\ RI SHUVRQDOLVDWLRQ DQG, in response tR WKH 8. JRYHUQPHQW¶V GHILFLW
reduction programme, the accompanying public expenditure cuts.  
 
The first manifestation of destatisation - personalisation - is operationalised through the 
distribution of individualised budgets (IBs) and Direct Payments (DPs) to service users 
(Boxall, Dowson and Beresford, 2009). Underpinning these budgets is a market ideology 
encouraging choice and control for users by allowing them to purchase services from a range 
of providers (Needham, 2011: Glasby, Glendinning and Littlechild, 2006). The Scottish 
Nationalist administration is furthering the personalisation agenda through a ten year strategy 
EHJLQQLQJLQWRGULYHµa  cultural  shift around  the  delivery  of  care  and  support  in  
Scotland,  with  self-GLUHFWHGVXSSRUW>SHUVRQDOLVDWLRQ@EHFRPLQJWKHPDLQVWUHDPDSSURDFK¶ 
(Scottish Government, 2010, pp. 2). From 2010, this shift includes the development of pilot 
projects of DP-led services among networks of providers (Scottish Government, 2010) and 
introducing the Social Care (Self-directed Support) (Scotland) Act 2013 designed to 
encourage the increased use of DPs and IBs (Kettle, 2015).  
 
The responsibility for distributing DPs and IBs is with local authorities (the second tier of 
government in the UK and Scotland). Local authorities historically facilitated service delivery 
through distributing block contracts to agencies through competitive tenders. Unlike DPs and 
IBs, block contracts distribute funding directly to providers to resource care for groups of 
vulnerable and disadvantaged people. In contrast, personalisation enables local authorities to 
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facilitate the empowerment of service users, to varying degrees, with the status of the 
customer through placing funding for services directly in their hands, rather than with 
providers (Needham, 2011: Ellis, 2007).  
 
The ten year strategy occurs at a time of renewed impetus in Scotland behind the second 
plank of destatisation ± the cutting of welfare expenditure under the UK Conservative-led 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VDXVWHULW\SROLFLHV(Bach, 2012). With a bigger budget deficit than the rest of the 
UK (8.1% of GDP, compared to 5.6%), Scotland faces challenging cost containment 
pressures. Scottish spending experienced a larger drop than the rest of the UK of around £300 
per person, compared to £100 in 2013/14 (Scottish Government, 2015). Personalisation can 
potentially complement these public expenditure cuts, as pilot studies of DPs in England 
found local authorities are motivated by cost concerns rather than quality, leading to 
reductions in expenditure (Daly, 2002: Ellis, 2007: West 2013). During austerity, Scottish 
local authorities may use lessons from these pilots and exercise their power to reduce 
resources allocated to individual budgets.  
 
Such local government actions would detrimentally affect the purchasing power of 
customers, but also the income security of non-profits in receipt of DPs. One of the outcomes 
of destatisation has been a blurring of public ± private sector boundaries (Jessop, 2003). In 
this more financially precarious environment, continued blurring may occur as non-profits 
compete to attract potentially thousands of users with DPs and prevent existing ones exiting 
their organisation if dissatisfied.  
 
The workforce is central to achieving organisational appeal in this competitive market, because 
care possesses the distinct characteristics of service work, i.e. simultaneous production and 
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consumption, intangibility in demands and WKHFXVWRPHU¶VSUHVHQFHLQWKHODERXUSURFHVV. Much 
RI WKH FXVWRPHU¶V VHQVH RI VDWLVIDFWLRQ LV JDLQHG IURP WKLV GLUHFW LQWHUDFWLRQ ZLWK ZRUNHUV
(Korczynski, 2002). These common characteristics of service work, therefore, call for an 
appropriate blend of HRM policies to secure employee flexibility and commitment to the goals 
of customer satisfaction (Korczynski, 2002). 
 
Work and employment implications 
A theoretical framework is needed to explore subsequent possible changes to non-profit 
employment policies from the above policy pressures of increasing customer sovereignty and 
cost control. This study uses .RUF]\QVNL¶VµFXVWRPHUorientaWHGEXUHDXFUDF\¶(COB) (2002). 
This concept presents a useful framework as it recognises how workplace social relations in 
service organisations can be influenced by macro characteristics in society, such as shifts in 
the authority and identity of the customer (Korczynski, Shire, Frenkel and Tam, 2000). 
Moreover, the concept further recognises how increasing customer authority in service 
organisations inevitably coexists with demands for savings and efficiency (Korczynski, 2002). 
For non-profit COBs, personalisation and public sector austerity represent the sources of shifts 
in customer authority and demands for cost savings respectively that may increasingly 
influence their employment policies.   
 
Within private service organisations facing similar pressures for customer satisfaction and 
rationalisation, Korczynski (2002) argues that COBs apply seemingly contradictory 
approaches to labour utilisation - ¶KDUG¶ DQG µVRIW¶HRM (Storey, 1992 µ+DUG¶+5M sees 
labour as a IDFWRURISURGXFWLRQDQGDUHVRXUFHWREHH[SORLWHGDQGPDQLSXODWHGµ6RIW¶+50
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sees labour as a resource to be nurtured in order to encourage commitment (Storey, 1992). 
Combined, the two approaches are seen as helping to build the fragile social order and 
appropriate staff orientation, flexibility and commitment to ensure customer satisfaction in 
COBs (Korczynski, 2002). 
 
The following summary presents potential outcomes for employment among non-profit COBs. 
7KH VXPPDU\ LV QRW SUHVFULSWLYH DV .RUF]\QVNL¶V DQDO\VLV  DFNQRZOHGJHV WKDW
employment outcomes from similar pressures can vary in different settings. Furthermore, what 
follows does not suggest providers will pursue one or the other employment strDWHJ\µ+DUG¶
DQG µ6RIW¶ +50 DUH QRW PXWXDOO\ H[FOXVLYH DV LQGLYLGXDO SROLFLHV FDQ EH DSSOLHG
simultaneously in one organisation (Storey, 1992). 
 
Soft HRM 
As local authorities distribute increasing numbers of DPs in the social care market, non-profits 
may have to appeal to newly empowered budget holders by offering some guarantee of 
customer satisfaction from services. Such appeal is seen to be acquired through COBs 
µGHOLJKWLQJ¶RUµHnchanting¶ customers (Korczynski, 2002). Non-profit COBs may potentially 
achieve such levels of XVHUVDWLVIDFWLRQ WKURXJK WKHXVHRIµVRIW¶+50SROLFLHV WREXLOG WKH
QHFHVVDU\µFXVWRPHURULHQWDWLRQ¶DPRQJVWDII.RUF]\QVNL2QHDSSURDFKPD\EHWRHQG
anonymity in service provision characterised by users being served by multiple workers 
without any continuity or familiarity with their needs. Studies reveal how to end anonymity 
HPSOR\HUVEXLOGPRUHSHUVRQDOVHUYLFHHQFRXQWHUVWKURXJKFRQVWUXFWLQJµSVHXGR-UHODWLRQVKLSV¶
between customers and workers (Gutek, 1995, pp 71). To develop such relationships non-profit 
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recruitment policies may be re-orientated to include the requirement for candidates to possess 
characteristics that include exhibiting a µILW¶EHWZHHQWKHLUown lifestyle interests and those of 
customers.  
 
OWKHU µVRIW¶ +50 RXWFRPHV PD\ DULVH IURP WKH XQLWDULVW µZLQ-ZLQ¶ UKHWRULF within the 
personalisation agenda, where reciprocal worker and customer satisfaction are viewed as 
essential for service quality (Needham, 2011). Personalisation reportedly achieves such 
mutuality by developing workforce skills through greater task participation and discretion to 
encourage commitment to customer goals (Needham, 2011). Again, to secure appropriate 
levels of customer satisfaction, non-SURILW &2%V PD\ LPSOHPHQW µVRIW¶ +50 policies to 
enhance training so workers exhibit the necessary orientation and practical skills. Such 
customer values and norms can be further cascaded into performance appraisal (Korczynski, 
2002).  
 
µ+DUG+50¶ 
In contrast to the above µVRIW¶HPSOR\HHFRPPLWPHQW LQGXFLQJ HR DSSURDFK.RUF]\QVNL¶V
(2002) COB concept also highlights how pressures for rationalisation and efficiency in services 
leads organisations to implement µhDUGHU¶ +50 SROLFLHV 7KLV µKDUG¶ DSSURDFK potentially 
brings pressures for multiple forms of employment degradation, standardisation and 
bureaucratisation to non-profit COBs.   
 
For example, greater insecurity for workers within non-profit COBs may come from several 
sources. Despite the distinctions between µsoft¶DQGµKDUG¶HRM (Storey, 1992), ambiguities 
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are present because of the potential for a double meaning and purpose within Human Resource 
(HR) policies (Legge, 2005). Recruitment, for example, may serve a dual purpose that contains 
D µKDUGHU¶ DJHQGD. Specifically, in social care, time is a predominant characteristic in the 
employment offer and is characterised by extended and fragmented work schedules to allow 
employers to focus delivery during periods of high demand (Rubery, Grimshaw, Hebson and 
Urgarte, 2015). Personalisation exacerbates uncertainty around working time (Rubery and 
Urwin, 2011) because it places customer preferences regarding the timing of service 
interventions and their satisfaction at its centre (Needham, 2011). In this context, non-profits 
may follow the path of other COBs, by pursuing recruitment policies that encourage greater 
workforce temporal flexibility (Korczynski, 2002). State policies of personalisation, therefore, 
potentially encourage non-profits to further erode standard employment relationships through 
greater casualisation, bringing possible disruptions to the work ± life balance of the care 
workforce.  
 
2WKHUµKDUG¶LQWHUYHQWLRQVPD\HPHUJHZLWKLQQRQ-profits as customer authority influences the 
content of bureaucratic workplace rules and regulations. Here, non-profits may fashion a µGXDO
DXWKRULW\¶ or the perception of two bosses over employees. Customer sovereignty is 
strengthened through a process of bureaucratisation within COBs that formalises user priorities 
and authority within forms of management control (e.g. discipline, attendance, performance 
management) (Korczynski, 2002: Korczynski, et al 2000).  
 
µ+DUG¶+50SROLFLHVPD\DOVRHPHUJHZLWKLQnon-profits as a rational response to WKHVWDWH¶V
demands for austerity cuts, and more efficiently delivered services disseminated through the 
newly emerging market of IBs and DPs. The expression of customer choices, competition 
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among providers to attract budgets, underpinned by expenditure cuts will exacerbate cost 
pressures in non-profits. Previous studies utilizing the COB concept have shown that service 
RUJDQLVDWLRQV DSSO\ µKDUG¶ +50 interventions in response to such cost pressures through 
rationalisation and efficiency initiatives (Korczynski, 2002: Korczynski, et al, 2000). For non-
profit workers, this suggests a degradation in employment conditions, jobs insecurity, and 
pressures on the labour process through work intensification, standardisation and deskilling.  
 
Caution has to be applied regarding the aforementioned outcomes, as state ± society relations 
LQSURFHVVHVRIµKROORZLQJRXW¶UHSUHVHQWDQDUHQDRIVWUXJJOHZKHUHJRYHUQPHQWSROLFLHVDUH
prone to challenge and failure (Kjaer, 2011). Non-profits may resist state pressure to 
reconfigure missions, ways of working and employment conditions. Customers, additionally, 
may be constrained by barriers such as producer power and expertise or by their own 
unwillingness or incapacity to express choice (Boxall, et al, 2009: Osborne, Beattie and 
Williamson, 2002). 
 
In the light of the above, the article has three concerns. Firstly, to what extent do contemporary 
processes of destatisation ± personalisation and austerity ± steer non-profit identities and roles 
towards more pro-market behaviours? Secondly, what changes do non-profit COBs bring to 
their employment policies as a result of increasing pressure to respond to customer authority 
and austerity? Thirdly, what are the gains or losses for workers from these changes?  
 
METHOD  
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The study originates from concerns regarding how personalisation and austerity impact on the 
management of employment in non-profit organisations. Research questions were developed 
from the inter-organisational, hollowing out, personalisation and customer ± orientated 
bureaucracy literatures. The fieldwork was undertaken throughout 2011- 12 using semi-
structured interviews in six local authorities and eight non-profits. The fieldwork occurred at 
a time of considerable changes to the Scottish social care market.  The 6FRWWLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶V
ten year strategy was underway (Scottish Government, 2010) and a number of local 
authorities were involved in pilot personalisation initiatives or had been undertaking efforts to 
personalise services for some years. In addition, the 2013 Act was passing through the 
Scottish Parliament, and was subject to significant publicity in the care sector. 
 
Table 1 outlines a profile of local authority (LAs) respondents selected because of the variety 
of approaches and timescales for moving towards personalising services. Interview schedules 
were developed from the aforementioned literatures, and undertaken with personalisation 
leads and contract managers (12 interviews). Pilot interviews were undertaken in LA2, and 
the schedules were subsequently amended. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
Semi-structured interviews occurred with non-profit (NP) Chief Executive Officers (&(2¶V), 
Human Resource (HR) and senior operational managers (24 respondents), outlined in Table 
2. Organisations were chosen because of their participation in developing personalisation 
programmes, as well as diversity in service setting, i.e. learning disabilities, mental health or 
multiple providers. Interview questions were developed from themes identified in the 
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literature. Pilot interviews were undertaken in NP1 and research instruments were amended. 
Additional scrutiny was made of organisational documents and websites.  
 
All interviews were transcribed verbatim. Analysis was undertaken through identifying 
patterns related to research questions and themes in the literature. Sub-themes were then 
identified, and codes generated (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The first iteration of coding 
involved exploring local authority efforts to enable customer empowerment, austerity 
measures, changing expectations and financial implications on providers, and their workforce 
consequences. The second, was concerned with broad change to non-profit HR policies 
DFURVVWKHµVRIW¶aQGµKDUG¶GLPHQVLRQVRXWOLQHGDERYH$WKLUGFRGLQJLWHUDWLRQinvolved 
gaining a more robust picture of the implications of personalisation and austerity in non-
profits which included identifying tensions and contradictions. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
FINDINGS 
Changing roles and identities in social care in an era of personalisation and austerity 
This section addresses the first research question by exploring changing identities and roles 
among actors within the social care market. Local authorities implementing personalisation in 
the social care market were attempting to steer service users and non-profits towards different 
behaviours. The pace and extent of change varied across regions. Local authority approaches 
ranged from participation in Scottish government pilot personalisation programmes (LA4 and 
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LA5), early cautious projects (LA2, and LA3), rapid large scale transformation (LA1), and 
the continuation of a ten year programme of developing personalised services (LA6).  
 
Further diversity in policy implementation was apparent when respondents discussed 
attempts to alter the behaviours of service users to that of customers. Here, authorities 
distributed DPs to encourage users to begin to express choices in the selection of providers 
and services. Due to the complexity of change, this distribution of DPs was undertaken with 
one service user group at a time, e.g. beginning with physical or intellectual disabilities and 
later to others such as mental health services. LA1, LA3 and LA5 envisaged that their actions 
were building a free market of autonomous customers exercising choice among networks of 
providers based on assessments of price and quality. In contrast, LA6 and LA4 felt the 
transition to customer-like behaviour was more constrained, because service groups such as 
older people could have strong attachments to existing providers and staff. This contrasted 
with younger users with more limited histories of institutional or provider services, and little 
loyalty to organisations or their staff.  
 
Consistency was apparent in several other respects, however. All authorities brought non-
profits together for a series of information events to promote change. Moreover, irrespective 
of the aforementioned variability in implementation, µcustomer empowerment¶ through the 
distribution of DPs and IBs was strictly within the confines of local authorities 
simultaneously implementing unprecedented funding reductions in social care. Indeed, 
financial measures (distribution of budgets, cuts etc.) represented the key tool with which 
authorities altered the behaviour of other social care actors under personalisation.  
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Cuts were justified through claims that personalisation represented an opportunity to reassess 
some services that were over-funded with the aim of reducing welfare dependency. 
Reassessments involved local authorities following a format familiar to negotiating block 
contracts. Specifically, discussions were primarily focused on deciding how many hours of 
care were to be provided and then determining the price per hour. Once these criteria were 
established there appeared limited emphasis on the quality of life outcomes prescribed under 
personalisation. Providers confirmed this process and stated how in many cases such 
reassessments involved a reduction in support. Each local authority also introduced shrinking 
eligibility criteria for users regarding access to services and imposed personal charges for 
those over certain income levels. 
 
For LA2, LA3, LA4 and LA5 savings targets under personalisation were vague. LA1 and 
LA6, however, specifically established targeted percentage spending reductions as key 
performance indicators through the distribution of DPs. LA6 implemented 5 percent savings 
in this way, but LA1 was the boldest estimating expenditure reductions from its 
personalisation programme of 20 percent.  
 
The budget savings target under personalisation is the biggest single savings target 
this council has ever had to make in its existence (Personalisation lead, LA1). 
 
These same savings targets were then transmitted by these authorities to providers through 
equivalent reductions in the new hourly rate for DPs.  
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Local authorities were anticipating and advocating changes to the roles of non-profits in this 
changing social care market. LA1, LA3 and LA5 advocated that non-profits no longer 
receiving income security through local authority block contracts woulGKDYHWRµUH-invent 
WKHPVHOYHV¶7KLVUHLQYHQWLRQZRXOGEH to cope with the uncertainty of customers possessing 
the ability to change providers. Non-profits failing to build a competitive appeal and be 
responsive to customer needs would not survive.  
 
The best of them will remain and the ones that are not quite as able will not. To me 
personally, in some ways that is a good thing... If they are not prepared to engage and 
VHHWKDWWKH\KDYHWRFKDQJHWKHQWKH\DUHQRWJRLQJWRVXUYLYH,GRQ¶WVHHWKDWDVD
bad thing, that is the competitive market (Personalisation lead, LA5).   
 
Indeed, in the long-term the three respondents quoted in this section anticipated the end of 
large-scale employment among non-profits and a move towards the development of 
brokerage organisations, linking customers to accredited, self-employed Personal Assistants. 
The other local authorities felt that change would not be as profound as some service users 
were reluctant to change providers.  
 
All local authorities, however, anticipated significant changes to non-profit employment 
policies and worker roles. Respondents wanWHGWKHVHFWRU¶VZRUNIRUFHWRHPEUDFHDVWURQJHU
commitment to customer service, satisfaction and flexibility in return for acquiring new 
skills. One such skill involved community integration, where staff attempted to build lasting 
personal relationships between customers and residents in their local area. LA1, LA3 and 
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LA5 also predicted greater job insecurity for workers from customers¶DELOLW\WRVZLWFK
providers if dissatisfied with services. Moreover, it was further anticipated that austerity 
meant that providers would have to make savings to employment costs.  
 
Some non-profit organisations have got conditions of service that mirror the public 
VHFWRU«EXWLW¶VQRWVXVWDLQDEOH7KH\QHHGWRWKLQNDERXWWKHWHUPVDQG conditions of 
their workforce (Personalisation lead, LA1). 
 
Changes to the non-profit operating environment  
As a result of changes described in previous sections, from 2010 non-profits experienced 
financial difficulties. NP1 experienced annual funding cuts of 4 per cent. Between 2008 ± 
2012, NP2 reported a loss in turnover of 20 ± 25 percent. NP4 refused to bid for particular 
tenders because the funding was unsustainable. Finally, NP8 had major contracts reduced by 
the equivalent of 5-6% for concurrent years 2010-2011. NP1, NP2 and NP8 were 
increasingly vulnerable to cuts because the bulk of their funding came from LA1, which 
implemented 20 percent expenditure reductions through DPs. These respondents noted how 
/$XVHGDUKHWRULFRIµcustomer affordability¶ to justify cuts without acknowledging its 
responsibility in determining resources available to users. 
 
3HUVRQDOLVDWLRQLWVHHPVWREHJHWWLQJORVW:HXQGHUVWDQGWKHFRXQFLO¶VJRWDQ
impossible job to balance the books« One of the senior officers of the council [LA1] 
said - ³Personalisation is not the cause of the cuts, but is the vehicle through which we 
will achieve the savings we have to make.´ (CEO, NP1). 
19 
 
 
The following two sections address questions two and three regarding HR change and gains 
and losses for workers. The sections are not mutually exclusive as each contains data 
pertaining to both questions. 
 
The impact on non-profit employment policies 
As a result of the pressures outlined above, organisations made efforts to change their 
employment policies to secure customer satisfaction. Table 3 reveals the changes across 
µVRIW¶DQGµKDUG¶+50SROLFLHVDPRQJnon-profit COBs.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
As outlined in the literature, workplace processes, procedures and rules came to reflect the 
influence of customer sovereignty. To appeal to new customers, for example, all non-profits 
changed their recruitment policies. Non-profits attempted to recruit candidates that, in 
addition to possessing the traditional sector values (e.g. a desire to care and serve the interests 
of vulnerable people, and altruism), had a close µILW¶with customer lifestyles and hobbies. In 
line with this, recruitment processes included service visits by potential employees to interact 
with XVHUVWRHVWDEOLVKZKHWKHUWKHUHZDVµILW¶EHWZHHQWKHWZR(six cases except NP5 and 
NP8). Non-profits further introduced direct user involvement in selection panels (except NP2 
and NP8); personalised job descriptions and person specifications; and personalised adverts 
(except NP1 and NP3).  
20 
 
 
The competencies are different, we might say.  ³:e have a particular need within a 
service we are looking for somebody who enjoys swimming´ Whatever the particular 
specification from the service user is (Senior Operational Manager, NP4). 
 
Where utilised, relief staff underwent similar recruitment processes so that in cases of 
absences and holidays there was continuity in customer orientation. 
 
It means we're never in a situation where someone is going out to support someone 
that they have never met before (Senior manager, NP5). 
 
Organisations further introduced µVRIW¶+5LQWHUYHQWLRQV such as upskilling, team working 
and task participation VRWKHLUZRUNIRUFHVGHYHORSHGDSSURSULDWHµILW¶ZLWKFXVWRPHUOLIHVW\OHV. 
The aim was to encourage µZLQ± ZLQ¶RXWFRPHVIRUworkers and customers. NP3, NP5 and 
NP7 recruited staff into small, self-managing teams allowing input into rotas, tasks and 
participation with customers in designing services. NP4 piloted direct customer involvement 
in the design and delivery of aspects of training, leading to reports of positive feedback from 
workers and users. NP3 piloted a job role designed to coach service users into improving 
their mental health.  The workforce implications included up-skilling through the 
development of new career paths. NP3, NP4, NP5 and NP7 trained employees to work with 
FXVWRPHUVXVLQJµRXWFRPH-EDVHGUHYLHZV¶2%5V2%Rs attempted to give the respective 
parties a voice in developing µVRIWHU¶individual quality of life outcomes rather than uniform 
services for users.  
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 A µKDUGHU¶+5HQYLURQPHQW also emerged from personalisation and increasing customer 
authority. This HR approach reflected the contradiction at the heart of COBs between 
aspiring to deliver customer-orientated services through a committed workforce, but in a 
financial context which compelled organisations to degrade employment conditions. 
Recruitment processes, for example, reflected the increasing unpredictability and intangibility 
of customer preferences over when services were delivered. A number of providers (see 
Table 3) increasingly recruited staff on flexible, casual contracts or introduced more 
fragmented shift patterns.  
 
WLWKSHUVRQDOLVDWLRQZH¶OOKDYHWRFKDQJHGUDPDWLFDOO\6RZH¶YHEHHQLQFUHDVLQJRXU
relief workers, and also zero hour contrDFWVDQGGLIIHUHQWYDULDWLRQVRIWKDW«What 
,¶PJHWWLQJIURPVRPHRIWKHVHUYLFHVDVZHOOLVWKDWZHPLJKWVWDUWORRNLQJDWVSOLW
VKLIWV,W¶VDOOJRLQJWREHIRUWKHSHUVRQZH¶UHZRUNLQJIRUZKLFKPLJKWQRWEHTXLWH
so good for employees (HR Manager, NP2). 
 
µ+DUGHU¶coercive measures included instilling fear among workers by increasing perceptions 
of job insecurity from the risks associated with customers exiting services if dissatisfied. 
Each organisation reported diminishing capacity to redeploy staff if a customer exited. 
Redeployments would, again, be dependent on a close fit between customer and worker 
interests. This presented a pressure on workers to align themselves closely with the lifestyles 
and choices of particular customers to ensure continued employment.  
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Employees are able to think this person has got an individual budget« LIWKH\GRQ¶W
like my support then they can say ³I would prefer some other organisation´. It allows 
an employer to reinforce the idea that there is a shift in power going on (CEO, NP5). 
 
NP6 re-LQWHUYLHZHGH[LVWLQJVWDIIIRUWKHLUUROHVWRDVFHUWDLQWKHLUµILW¶ZLWKFXVWRPHU
lifestyles. Employees failing these interviews could be redeployed, but others were 
µSHUIRUPDQFHPDQDJHG¶RXWRIWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ 
 
Measures reflecting HPSOR\HUV¶GHVLUHWRILQGDµILW¶EHWZHHn customer needs and the 
workforce had further implications for traditional bureaucratic workplaces processes rules 
and processes. NP5 and NP4 introduced customer authority in bureaucratic procedures such 
as performance appraisal. Here, users in discussions with management and workers, 
established lifestyle choices in their OBRs. These initial opportunities for workers to be 
involved in establishing priorities in service provision were overtaken, however, by pressures 
for bureaucratisation, standardisation and monitoring, as local authorities demanding value 
for money sought evidence of such outcomes being achieved. Subsequently, workers became 
accountable for helping achieve these lifestyle choices as management categorised them as 
key performance indicators in their appraisals. Management then required workers to write 
records of daily activities with users as evidence of their progress towards achieving 
outcomes. 
 
Changes to absence management similarly reflected the organisational quest for customer 
satisfaction. A desire to provide consistency of service for users meant long-term absences 
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came under more scrutiny and workers facing undue pressure to return to work when long-
term sick. NP1, NP2, NP4 and NP6 reported difficulties accommodating long-term absences, 
in the face of threats from DP holders to exit services because key workers were missing.  
 
7KH\JRRIIVLFNEXWZKDWWKDWWKHQPHDQVLVWKDWWKHSHRSOHZHZRUNIRUWKH\DUHQ¶W
getting the consistent staff they should be getting. TKHUH¶VDELWRIFRQIOLFWOur 
responsibility is to the people ZHZRUNIRUVRZHKDYHWRVD\LI\RX¶UHQRWDEOHWR
DWWHQGZRUNRQDUHJXODUEDVLVWKDW¶VQRJRRGWRWKLVLQGLYLGXDOVR\RXKDYHWRJRDQG
work somewhere else (Senior Operations Manager, NP2). 
 
Implications for employee terms and conditions 
Threats to non-profit efforts to sustain and encourage staff commitment to customer goals 
ZHUHXQGHUPLQHGE\FRQWUDGLFWRU\FRVWSUHVVXUHVWKDWDJDLQGHPDQGHGDµKDUGHU¶+5 
agenda. As local authority respondents predicted, austerity cuts had significant workforce 
implications leading to further degradation of employment conditions. In NP1 twenty 
workers were re-interviewed for posts at a lower paid support assistant level due to LA¶V
cuts to hourly rates for DPs. NP8 made redundancies in LA¶Varea. NP1, NP2 and NP7 
delayered management functions, intensifying the work of those remaining and removing 
promotion opportunities. Managers across the other organisations reported how workers 
directly linked public expenditure cuts to personalisation and the diminishing value of DPs, 
causing increased anxiety. 
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The workforce has found it very difficult because they think personalisation is just 
DERXWMREFXWV,W¶VDERXWWKHFRXQFLOVDYLQJPRQH\DQGSXWWLQJLWLQDIDQF\ZD\
They have really struggled because some of them are the only wage earner (senior 
operational manager, NP6). 
 
All respondents reported how anxiety was additionally linked to stricter local authority 
eligibility criteria and charging policies. These measures meant some customers for reasons 
of being denied a service or because of affordability issues exited services threatening 
organisational stability and jobs. 
 
Austerity and personalisation also influenced changes to working time. Providers labelled 
new local authority Framework Agreements as µzero hours contracts for organisations¶
(CEO, NP1).  Here, organisations were guaranteed a few hundred hours of service provision, 
with additional time contracted on a casual basis in accordance with demands from customers 
with DPs. This contrasted with block contracts that usually guaranteed several thousand 
hours. In response, NP1, NP2 and NP7 recruited workers on zero hour contracts passing 
insecurity and risk onto the workforce. Furthermore, the introduction of split shifts could 
reflect service cuts rather than customer choices. Local authority service reviews using the 
rhetoric of encouraging independence meant customers previously in receipt of continuous 
service, e.g. for 10 ± 15 hours per day, had them cut to perhaps a single or two blocks of 2 ± 3 
hours. Such changes could impact on service quality as users were left isolated without any 
support between visits. Moreover, to cover such fragmented services managers were forced to 
deploy workers on split shifts. These shifts driven by cuts added to the precariousness of 
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workers in NP2 and NP8 as the subsequent reductions in hours meant some reportedly had 
insufficient income to cover living costs.  
 
In contrast to the promises of upskilling from personalisation, the demands for savings meant 
deskilling occurred in some roles as NP1 and NP2 began recruiting zero hour contract 
workers at the starting grade of support assistant, rather than the previous practice of hiring 
higher grade support workers. These providers additionally made redundancies in their 
training functions. NP4 and NP5 further doubted their capacity to build skills, as block funds 
had contained finance for training but resources allocated through DPs were more uncertain. 
Furthermore, some of the staff gains from the upskilling associated with new roles in NP3 
came at a price. The project which developed new preventative roles (e.g. community 
integration) had previously undergone a process of retendering replacing traditional services 
and causing redundancies within the old provider. Moreover, the CEO reported part of the 
resources to pay the enhanced salaries of workers in the new roles were funded by removing 
the top two increments from its senior support worker pay scale.  
 
Other problems with pay, included NP1 cutting salaries by 5% and reducing sickness 
entitlement because of LA¶VQHZKRXUO\'3UDWHNP2, NP4, NP7 and NP8 doubted the 
future sustainability of their pay scales as DPs became more common and local authorities 
used them to save costs. Finally, work intensification emerged through the unpaid extension 
of the working week from 37 and a half days to 39 (NP1 and NP2) and the removal of two 
days holiday entitlement (NP1).  
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The above changes impacted on non-SURILWV¶ability to recruit suitable employees with the 
appropriate customer orientation, with NP2 reporting it was unable to recruit qualified 
nursing staff and HYHQ]HURKRXU¶VFRQWUDFWZRUNHUV 
 
It's really hard to get people because they don't see it as a career any more. Support 
work is the new retail. There are no barriers to entry, so where people historically 
would go and work in pubs or shops and stuff like that. We are catching that bit of the 
workforce now.  People will come in and work for us until they find what they really 
want to do (Senior Manager, NP4). 
 
Tensions emerged within non-profits from the above outcomes. The first related to 
contradictions between the goal of customer satisfaction and worker rights. Respondents 
reported employee concerns over the need for work-life balance, allowing sufficient absence 
periods for those suffering genuine illness, concerns over the deskilling of certain roles, and 
reassurance and protection under traditional disciplinary procedures from arbitrary customer 
DFWLRQVDVDUHVXOWRIWKHODWWHU¶VLQYROYHPHnt in appraisal. Reports further emerged of 
employees being frustrated about the promises of improved provision of care, but the reality 
of reduced service quality because of cuts. 
 
Austerity funding led to tensions over pay as some providers (NP5 and NP6) wanted to 
sustain their salary scales to protect employee morale, and pointed to their ability to gain 
multiple sources of funding as a factor that may help in this regard. Management in NP5 and 
NP6 felt that a variety of funding settlements across the public sector, confidence in the 
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organisational ability to secure business from among DP holders, and the emergence of other 
income streams would allow them to avoid the worst of austerity and its negative 
employment implications.  
 
DISCUSSION  
7KLVVWXG\¶VXVHRIWKHµKROORZLQJRXW¶WKHVLVand COB concept provides a useful framework 
to understand the sociology of non-profit ± state relationships in an era of personalisation and 
austerity. The literature identified personalisation and austerity as contemporary 
manifestations of the key goals of destatisation. To implement the two policies, the state 
intensifies competition in the social care market through expanding the enabling role of local 
authorities to supposedly empower service users through the allocation of personal budgets. 
As highlighted in the literature (Daly, 2002: Ellis, 2007: West 2013), tKHVWDWH¶VSROLFLHVRI
austerity and personalisation are complementary as local authorities use individualised 
budgets to reduce expenditure in the name of customer affordability. These findings link to 
concerns regarding how customer sovereignty can be a way by the state to engineer 
reductions in public expenditure (Ellis, 2007: Thompson, 1995). Non-profits, in response, are 
expected to move further on a trajectory of becoming more pro-market (Van Til, 2000: 
Shields, Evans and Richmond, 2004: Shields 2014), as they attempt to enhance their 
competitive appeal to customers with DPs.  
 
7KHLPSDFWRIWKHFHQWUDOVWDWH¶VDFWLRQVDUHvariable, however. This is because hollowing out 
processes represent an arena of struggle (Kjaer, 2011), where waves of destatisation breed 
new problems for states in steering groups of actors towards adopting the requisite identities 
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and behaviours (Rhodes, 1994). Local authorities implement personalisation and austerity at 
different paces, or differ in the degree to which they link cuts to the distribution of DPs. 
Service user groups vary in their engagement with change. Moreover, non-profits exhibit 
varying degrees of vulnerability to these state pressures. Finally, some of these actors have 
concerns regarding the impact of these changes on service quality and potentially resist. 
 
The second and third research questions concerned changes to non-profit employment 
policies and subsequent gains and losses for workers from these altered state sector relations. 
The findings add to debates within the sociology of work about how customer sovereignty is 
a threat to working conditions (Korczynski et al, 2000: Bain and Taylor, 2000). Here, the 
state as the fourth actor in the employment relationship uses the macro-construct of customer 
sovereignty at a time of austerity to attempt to shape the behaviour of employers, customers 
and employees in outsourced public services. In using the COB concept to evaluate 
subsequent employment outcomes, data reveals how under state pressure non-profits 
introduce a range of µVRIW¶DQGµKDUG¶+50LQWHUYHQWLRQVWKDWEULQJdemanding performance 
expectations for staff as their roles are subordinated to customer sovereignty. As outlined in 
the literature (Korczynski, 2002) to achieve customer satisfaction, employers expect closer 
µILW¶ZLWKWKHOLIHVW\OHVDQGLQWHUHVWVof users. µ6RIW¶+50approaches to recruitment facilitate 
such goals E\IRFXVLQJRQFDQGLGDWHV¶ potential to µILW¶ZLWKFXVWRPHUOLIHVW\OHVµ6RIW¶+50 
does, moreover, bring advantages to some employees through skills acquisition, and 
increasing participation in shaping services (Needham, 2011).  
 
Yet, WKHVWDWH¶VFDOOVIRUSHUVRQDOLVDWLRQDWDWLPHRIpublic service austerity brings multiple 
forms of employment degradation for non-profit social care workers. Non-profits increase the 
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disposability and insecurity of workers through µhDUGHU¶+50interventions. In accordance 
with the concerns outlined in the literature (Rubery and Urwin, 2011) under personalisation 
recruitment processes exhibit a dual agenda (Legge, 2005) by introducing greater 
casualization through the increasing use of zero hour contracts. µHDUG¶HRM also enhances 
customer authority over traditional areas of bureaucratic management control such as absence 
and performance management (Korczynski, et al 2000 and Korczynski, 2002), leading to 
intensifying job insecurity if employees fail to fit with customer needs. This study further 
reveals how the combination of personalisation and austerity causes significant degradation 
through implications for pay and holidays, the deskilling of roles, changes to working time, 
standardisation and increased performance monitoring.  
 
The sociological concept of the COB (Korczynski, 2002) also illuminates the contradictions 
between WKHµVRIW¶DQGµKDUG¶+5SROLFLHVZLWKLQnon-profits.  Non-profit workers expected to 
exhibit commitment to customer goals face diminishing employment conditions. Opportunities 
for greater involvement in planning services are transformed into standardised, bureaucratic 
performance management monitoring procedures. Tensions arise between increasing emphasis 
on customer sovereignty in workplace rules and processes and worker rights. Employees share 
doubts raised by other stakeholders concerning the supposed service quality gains under 
personalisation. Such tensions within these workplaces are inevitable and irreconcilable when 
the state cedes responsibility for public services to networks of non-profits at a time of demands 
for greater customer sovereignty in delivery, but when resources are sharply constrained under 
austerity.  
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The findings raise doubts concerning whether employees are successfully steered into the 
behaviours, attitudes and identities required by the state. The study, however, relies exclusively 
on management and local authority respondents, providing limited insight into the lives of 
workers effected by destatisation. For the purposes of future research, the COB can further act 
as a framework to explore the outcomes of such tensions and contradictions on worker 
behaviours and attitudes. Specifically, whether such pressures lead to worker resistance that 
disrupts the fragile social order of non-profit organisations DQGWKHVWDWH¶VDLPVLQVRFLDOFDUH
(Korczynski, 2002).  
 
Conclusion 
Personalisation and austerity are pushing non-profits to varying degrees towards more pro-
market behaviours. Findings, however, suggest difficulties for the state in steering non-profits 
and other social care actors towards the type of behaviours needed to fulfil its policy goals. 
Differences in local authority implementation, service user engagement with change and 
provider vulnerability lead to variable outcomes across the sector. To respond to state 
pressures for rationalisation and greater customer authority, workforce reforms involve non-
profits implementing µVRIW¶DQGµKDUG¶+5SROLFLHVWorkers experience some benefits, but 
also significant employment degradation. At the same time, the workplace consequences of 
personalisation and austerity influence the success, or otherwise, of state efforts to introduce 
such market-orientated reforms. To gain a fuller understanding of the outcomes of these 
workplace dynamics, further research on the impact of employee attitudes and behaviours is 
needed. Research using this DUWLFOH¶Vtheoretical framework should also extend into other 
outsourced public services facing similar reforms. 
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Table 1: Local authority Respondents 
Respondents LA1 LA2 LA3 LA4 LA5 LA6 
Urban/Rural Urban Urban Urban Rural Rural Urban/Rural 
Participants Personalisation 
lead and 
Finance 
Officer 
Personalisation 
Lead and 
Contracts 
Manager 
Personalisation 
Lead and 
Contracts 
Manager 
Personalisation 
Lead 
Personalisation 
Lead and 2 
Contracts 
Managers 
Personalisation 
Lead and Head 
of Social 
Services 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Profile of participating Non-profit organisations  
 NP1 NP2 NP3 NP4 NP5 NP6 NP7 NP8 
Service users Mental 
health 
Mental 
Health, 
addictions, 
learning 
disability 
Mental 
health 
Learning 
disability 
Learning 
disability 
Learning 
disability 
Learning 
Disability 
Physical 
disability 
Numbers of local 
authority funders 
(participating 
authorities in 
brackets) 
1 (LA1) 7 (LA1, 
LA2, 
LA4, 
LA6) 
14 
(LA1, 
LA2, 
LA3 
& 
LA6) 
 
3 (LA3) 14 (All six 
participating 
authorities) 
16 (LA1, 
LA2, 
LA3, 
LA4 & L 
6) 
5 (LA1 & 
LA2) 
12 (LA1 & 
LA3) 
Workforce 
numbers 
100 
(approx.) 
400 + 
 
300 + 450-500 
 
1500 + 1000 + Less than 
250 
350 
Senior 
Management 
interviews (incl. 
Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) 
 
4 3 3 3  3 3 2 3 
Union recognition Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y 
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Table 3&KDQJHVWRµVRIW¶+53ROLFLHVDVDUHVXOWRISHUVRQDOLVDWLRQDQGausterity (¥ In place, P = Proposed) 
 µ6RIW¶+50SROLFLHV µ+DUG¶+503ROLFLHV 
 Training and 
development 
reflects 
customer 
input 
Team 
working, 
multi-
skilling 
Appraisal 
focused on 
customer 
outcomes 
Recruitment 
and selection 
focusing on 
µILW¶ZLWK
customer 
lifestyles 
Redeployment 
opportunities 
limited 
Absence 
policies 
reflecting 
customer 
authority 
Increase 
in Zero 
hour 
contracts 
& split 
shifts 
Relief staff 
recruited 
WRµILW¶ZLWK
lifestyles 
Pay 
reflecting 
changes to 
direct 
payments 
etc. 
NP1 -  P ¥ P ¥ ¥ - ¥ 
NP2 -  P ¥ P ¥ ¥ - - 
NP3 ¥ ¥ - ¥ 3 ¥ ¥ ¥ - 
NP4 ¥ ¥ - ¥ 3 ¥ ¥ ¥ - 
NP5 ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ - - ¥ - 
NP6 ¥ - ¥ ¥ ¥ - ¥ ¥ - 
NP7 ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ - ¥ - - 
NP8 - - P ¥ P ¥ P - - 
 
